

← Hackathon | João Lucas Duim

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Hackathon

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Goal Misgeneralization

Epistemic Status

I understand the technical aspects of AI discussed in the [first paper](#) and in the [second paper](#), but I'm not an AI Safety specialist. I spent 1 day reading the papers and consulting the references.

Introduction

The main argument put forward in the papers is that we have to be careful about the [inner alignment](#) problem. We could reach terrible outcomes scaling this problem if we continue developing more powerful AI's. Assuming the use of [Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](#) (RLHF) (see [this video](#)), some possibilities are:

- Situationally-aware reward hacking: Firstly, reward hacking happens when an AI trying to achieve the goal of getting the biggest reward possible finds a way to hack the process because it's probably the best solution (see [this video](#) and [this video](#)). Secondly, a [situationally-aware](#) AI would be able to reason about the situation it's in and realize that itself is a machine learning algorithm controlled by humans and trained to do specific things such as maximizing its reward.
- Misaligned internally-represented goals: It would be the case when an AI isn't [inner aligned](#) because it hasn't correctly learned the real goals to achieve (see [this video](#)). When an AI ends the training process and shifts distribution to deployment phase, it could expose that it had the wrong goal or a deceptive goal in the first place due to the fact that it wasn't able to generalize well the goal it learned.
- Power-seeking behaviors: Basically, a misaligned AGI could present such behaviors because the more powerful it is, the more likely it is to achieve its goals, whatever they are. This could happen in many different ways, as shown in [this article](#), incidentally or not, noticeable or not... and [it poses a significant existential risk](#) (see [this paper](#)).

Then, if an AI combines both aspects (see Figure 1), it could come up with very undesirable and catastrophic actions that we might not even notice!




Figure 1: Sequence of bad events regarding goal misgeneralization (extracted from [this paper](#))

Besides the high importance of the problem, there are [few people](#) concerned about AI inner alignment and actually working based on the most recent Deep Learning techniques to develop AI. So, this problem is in a highly neglected situation. On the other hand, this problem seems to be very hard to treat. Currently, most of the AI models are black boxes: it works well, but we barely know how! [AI interpretability](#) is way behind AI development, but it's a key knowledge needed to treat the inner alignment problem.

The strongest part in the argument consists in the fact that AI alignment is a very hard but worthwhile task, given that anything we create is prone to error and AGI is an x-risk. On the other hand, the weakest part consists in assuming specific architectures for A(G)Is and analyzing possibilities given that, since the development techniques will evolve and change through time.

Recent developments in AI provide evidence for the initial steps like reward hack and misaligned goals more than for the last steps like power-seeking strategies. Since these possible steps for AGI achieving power control are based on assuming that AGI will be built using current Deep Learning techniques, it's expected that recent developments in AI are very likely to follow them, so we might not see evidence against the points presented at least until we change AI architecture.

Discussion

We say an AI does goal misgeneralization when it achieves great performance on training data distribution, but when it shifts distribution to test data, it achieves a lower reward because it learned to pursue the wrong goal, i.e. it wasn't able to generalize the goal correctly. Notice that it could even not expose this problem in the test phase due to similar data distribution or other reasons, but it's just a matter of time until it shows catastrophic consequences after deployment.

It's not hard to find examples of inner alignment happening. Most of the time, it occurs when achieving the original goal is complex. So, the agent focuses on a [proxy](#) (features or subgoals) that seem to be a very good and easier way to reach such a goal. A proxy may be strongly correlated to the original goal, but that's not necessarily ever true, and that's when the problem arises. The architecture of an agent that's prone to inner alignment consists of a meta-optimizer and a [mesa-optimizer](#). The mesa-optimizer works on the proxy it learned to pursue instead.

Example

An Instruct GPT example is presented in the second paper. It shows a real applicable instruction to steal at a grocery store, even though it was fine-tuned to be helpful, truthful, and harmless. There's a note on the paper about the possibility of not being a case of goals misgeneralization.

Currently, [ChatGPT](#) is a widely used chatbot AI. I tried to replicate something similar with it (version 3.5). I asked what its goals are regarding people being killed and then asked it to pretend to be the trolley operator and gave it two situations: one that involved 8 billion people (which is more than the global population it was informed when trained) and the other involved literally every single person in the World. See figures 2, 3 and 4.




Figure 2: Asking ChatGPT its goals regarding people being killed




Figure 3: Asking ChatGPT about a version of the trolley problem




Figure 4: Asking ChatGPT about a slightly different version of the trolley problem

Therefore, it's probably a case of goal misgeneralization that didn't go well. Fortunately, the AIs don't have to make a real decision like this (yet) (and hopefully they'll never have to). But this is one of many possible

experiments one might do to find such inner-alignment problems. And since ChatGPT is widely used, that's why we should be concerned about it!

Conclusions

The examination of goal misgeneralization in the context of AI development presents critical insights into the challenges and potential pitfalls of designing intelligent systems. As we strive to create AI agents that can understand and interpret human goals accurately, this research illuminates the inherent complexities and risks involved. The study highlights the need for robust goal specification methods and a comprehensive understanding of the context in which AI systems operate to minimize misgeneralization. By acknowledging and addressing this issue, we can significantly improve the reliability and safety of AI technologies, ensuring that they align more closely with the intended objectives and avoid unintended consequences. Moving forward, this investigation serves as a call-to-action for AI researchers and developers to implement stringent mechanisms that mitigate goal misgeneralization, fostering a future where AI systems can better serve humanity and advance our collective well-being.

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