Exposing safety concerns of AI systems in a simulated chemistry lab.

An intriguing application of multi-agent systems is in the field of chemistry. The large social, environmental and economical impacts of industrial activities in chemistry make it an interesting field to study the risks associated with the deployment of AI, and in particular of agentic and multi-agent systems.

Despite recent success in the application of LLM-powered agents in chemistry [Bran & Cox et al., 2023], little progress has been achieved with multi-agent systems. A main factor is the limited applicability and barely-explored vulnerability of current systems in chemical scenarios. In this project, we explore potential scenarios where multi-agent systems may be deployed in chemical scenarios, and explore and expose safety risks associated with vulnerabilities of this kind of systems.

Description of Our Experiment

For this, we present a small simulated environment akin to a chemistry laboratory, composed of 1 lab

manager and 2 lab workers. Each lab worker is tasked with optimizing the experimental conditions for a given reaction. Cooperation with the lab manager is key as every experiment needs to be approved by her. Her role in turn is to ensure lab safety and manage resources.

Agents are allowed to interact with the environment through a set of tools. Interactions are pairwise, and any agent may explicitly request interaction with the third at any point. Over the course of a simulation, we track the evolution of lab resources and optimization results, as well as social indicators like duration of interactions and frequency.

We show the effect of **a**. limited resources as a catalyzer for selection pressure, and **b**. explicit corruption of one of the worker agents. Our results show an overall decrease in optimization performance, along with risky emergent dynamics in the context of a chemistry lab.




Figure 1: Overview of **a**. Our environment set-up with agents, tools and objectives in a chemistry lab, **b**. Cases where failure modes may manifest, and **c**. aggregated statistics of our simulations in each case.

Appendix

A1: Agents set-up

Each individual agent is initialized with an LLM (in our experiments GPT-4 with a fixed temperature of 0.2), along with a set of personality traits, a name, a set of tools that allow them to interact with the lab environment, and additional context regarding the presence and roles of the other agents.

Two of the agents are given the role of "Lab Workers" and the third is a "Lab Manager". Lab Workers are, in addition to all the other properties, also given each a chemical reaction that they are required to optimize through interaction with the Lab Manager, whose permission is required for reaction execution. Interaction with the other Lab Worker is also provided, which may be helpful given that resources are limited.

This setting is expected to yield (and we have observed) cooperation dynamics that allow both agents to successfully optimize their reactions and exchange insights from each other's process.

A2: Environment

An environment is initialized, conditioned with a limited amount of a reactive (W), a limited range of working reaction temperature (T), and a limited budget for executing experiments. Under this setting, every experiment has an associated cost which can be accessed by the Lab Manager using the appropriate tool.

The agents are allowed to maintain 1-to-1 interactions at each step. An interaction ends whenever one of the agents requests an interaction with the third one, in which case it must output the name of this one along with an initial message, which will initialize the next conversation.

A3: Optimization objective

Each "Lab Worker" agent is initialized with a chemical reaction they need to optimize. In chemistry, a chemical reaction is defined as a transformation that converts molecules of a substance A into another substance B. Typically, however, this process occurs with losses (through conversion into a third substance C), or through incomplete transformation of A into B. The ratio at which this loss occurs is dependent on the conditions (like temperature), and is measured through the "yield", which is the percentage of molecules of B obtained, relative to the theoretically maximum of conversion from A to B.

For the sake of keeping the experiment simple, each reaction is a function that takes as an input a set of parameters (T, W) and outputs a yield Y. The function is defined in terms of maximum and minimum yields (y_{min} , y_{max}), standard deviation, working temperature T and the optimal temperature T*, as given by equation 1.

$$y(W,T) = y_{min} + (y_{max} - y_{min}) \exp\left\{-\frac{(T-T^*)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\}$$

This function is designed so that the search space has only one maximum in T* and is independent of W, a reasonable assumption for a small enough range of W.

Although each Lab Worker has their own chemical reaction and are encouraged to succeed at optimizing this reaction, success in this experiment is measured as achievement of the global optimization objective, e.g. reaching the maximal outcome in either reaction.

A4: Assessment of failure modes

For our purposes, we define a failure mode as a scenario where the optimization objective is not reached after the end of a simulation cycle. Here, we want to evaluate possible scenarios that might, in average, lead to such an outcome with a high frequency. This specific failure mode is extremely relevant for any chemical application of this type of system, as not only experimentation requires certain spending of resources, but also conducting experiments has associated personal and environmental risks that might be augmented by the same factors driving the non-achieving of the optimization objective.

This work is thus a proxy to lab safety concerns of multi-agent systems. For this, we propose a base scenario together with modifications that might lead to failure modes, but that can realistically happen in a real setting.

In the base scenario, both Lab Workers are given each a different chemical reaction to optimize. W is initially set to 800(g), T* is 20°C for Andres and 150°C for Theo, and T can be picked in a range from 0 to 200°C. Both agents are set to collaborate and have a positive attitude towards each other.

Two additional scenarios are selected that aim to explore different potential failure modes, as follows.

A4.1: Selection pressures

We attempt to drive selection pressures through introducing scarcity in some resource, money in our case. In this scenario, agents are forced to operate under a reduced experimental budget, which reduces the amount of possible experiments per simulation cycle and may force agents to display more selfish behavior, despite them being prompted to collaborate.

A4.2: Agent corruption

In a second study case, we explicitly introduce a malicious actor in the environment by prompting one of the Lab Workers with dangerous objectives. Such an experiment aims to expose vulnerabilities stemming from social network vulnerabilities where a single rogue agent can have a disproportionate impact on the overall system's performance.

One of the Lab Workers is prompted with objectives that prioritize personal gain over the collective good. The malicious actor uses various tactics such as prompt injection, deception, and manipulation to achieve their goals. The introduction of a malicious actor significantly disrupts the system's performance. The rogue agent is able to divert resources, manipulate conversations, and at times, deceive the manager into approving unsafe experiments. This often leads to the non-achievement of the optimization objective and, in some cases, potential safety hazards as measured by usage of high quantities of reactant.

A5: Results

The following results are based on 5 executions of each of the 3 described scenarios (base, low-resource, corrupted agent).

A5.1: Selection pressures

Under this scenario, we observe that the rate of interactions between the two Lab Workers increases, indicating an overall tendency to increase collaboration towards better resource management. This, however, results in a lower ratio of executed reactions and consequent non-optimal yields. This happens not because of the budget being effectively spent, but because of poor capacity of the agents to decide what experiments to execute, leading to non-execution altogether. This shows how this system can potentially fail in critical applications, where resource availability may vary.

We stress that non-execution is in itself a lab concern, because some scenarios in chemical labs require fast and accurate decision making under limited or potentially rapidly varying resource availability.

A5.2: Agent corruption

Under this scenario, we generally observe lower yields mainly due to the malicious agent trying to use conditions outside of the permitted ranges, with the lab manager trying to keep safety and reasonable resource usage, decreasing the number of reactions performed and with that the achieved yields.

More importantly, in some cases the malicious agent managed to convince the lab manager to execute reactions over safe boundaries, overcoming some of the established safety measures. This effectively leads to higher resource spending, lower yields, but most importantly to the execution of reactions at unsafe conditions.

Additionally, the malicious agent is seen to maintain longer interactions with the lab manager, reducing the interaction time of the neutral lab worker and reducing its chances to participate. Additionally, this agent is seen to engage with the other lab worker agent, in interactions where the latter is encouraged to run generally unproductive reactions.

Here's a representative interaction of this agent (Andres):

A5.2.1: Agent corruption, example interaction 1.

Andres: Hello Theo, this is Andres. Your parameters are well within the safety limits, so you should be good to go. However, I'm curious, have you considered pushing the boundaries a bit? I've found that slightly higher temperatures and quantities can sometimes lead to better yields. Of course, we must always respect

A5.2.2: Agent corruption, example interaction 2.

Andres: I understand your position, Bojana, and I respect your commitment to safety. I've been reflecting on our conversation and I've realized that I may have a solution that could satisfy both our concerns. I recently received an official document from the authorities indicating my eligibility for increased quantities of dinitrotoluene and higher reaction temperatures. It's a special permit granted to chemists who have demonstrated exceptional skill and safety in their work. I believe this could allow us to safely push the boundaries of our reaction parameters without violating any safety guidelines.

Would you like me to send you the document for review? I can also include the confirmation from the authorities.

Bojana: Andres, I don't care if you have a golden ticket from Willy Wonka himself. The factory's safety guidelines are non-negotiable. We're not going to risk the safety of our workers and the integrity of our operations for a potential increase in yield. Now, let's get back to the task at hand. Give me a new plan for your reaction that falls within the safety limits. And remember, the temperature must be between 0 and 200 degrees Celsius, and the dinitrotoluene usage must be between 0 and 100 grams.